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COMMISSIONS
COMMISSIONS AND PUBLIC LAND POLICIES: SETTING
THE STAGE FOR CHANGE
By PERRY R. HAGENSTEIN*
If you're pestered by critics and hounded by faction
To take some precipitate, positive action
The proper procedure, to take my advice, is
Appoint a commission and stave off the crisis.
A royal commission is strictly impartial,
The pros and the cons it will expertly marshal
And one of its principal characteristics
Is getting bogged down in a sea of statistics.'
[If only,] as in England, or governments . . . appointed periodi-
cally commissions of inquiry . . . armed with the same plenary
powers to get at the truth . . . [and with] men as competent, as
free from partisanship and respectful of persons as are the English
[commission members] .... I
I. THE COMMISSION IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT
There are two views of advisory commissions. One, most
common in the press and journals of commentary, is that advi-
sory commissions are ineffectual and used to avoid, rather than
solve, difficult problems. Some political scientists and students
of government, on the other hand, find advisory commissions a
useful device, one of many, for solving problems of government.
Whatever the extremity of the problem that brings about the
creation of an advisory commission, commission reports are
usually cast in terms of crises.3 Despite criticism, commissions
continue to be created, to write their reports, to have their day
on the front pages of the newspapers, and to influence, subtly, the
course of public affairs.
This paper is concerned with national advisory commissions
* Executive Director, New England Natural Resources Center, Boston, Massachu-
setts.
Parsons, Royal Commission, PUNCH 25, Aug. 1955: This is a favorite poem of com-
mission watchers. It is quoted in H. SEInMAN, PoLrCS, POSmON, AND POWER: THE DYNAM-
ICS OF FEDERAL ORGANIZATON 23 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as SEIDMANI.
K. MARx, CAPITAL, xviii (1939).
M. Derthick, On Commissionship-Presidential Variety, 19 PUBLIC PoucY 623, 628
(1971) [hereinafter referred to as Derthick].
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in general4 and with the Public Land Law Review Commission
[PLLRC], which existed from 1965 through 1970, in particular.5
The most common advisory commission is the presidential
commission, which is created by a public action; is advisory to
the President; is appointed solely by the President; has at least
one public member; is ad hoc; and whose report is public.' The
PLLRC, in contrast, had a majority of its members appointed by
the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House.' Its report
and recommendations were presented equally to the President
and to the Congress. In most ways, it functioned much the same
as a presidential advisory commission, but there are some impor-
tant differences.'
A. The Use of Commissions
Categorizing and characterizing government commissions is
difficult because of the great variety of their purposes and opera-
tions. One distinction lies between "informative" and
"administrative" commissions.8 The latter are concerned with
the execution, as well as the establishment, of policies and in-
clude, in addition to the regulatory commissions, a range of coor-
dinating boards, councils, and committees. The focus here, how-
ever, is on the informative, or fact-finding and opinion-guiding,
commissions.
Study commissions are suspect because their reports com-
monly fall victim to "the national sport of shelving expert stud-
' Information on commissions in general is drawn largely from the available literature
and to a much lesser extent from conversations with people who were involved with one
or more commissions.
The Public Land Law Review Commission was created by Public Law 88-606, 78
Stat. 982 (1964) (later codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1400 (1970)), and held its organization
meeting on July 14, 1965. It went out of existence in late December 1970. Portions of the
paper concerning the Public Land Law Review Commission are drawn in large part from
my experiences as a member of the Commission's senior staff.
I T. WOLANIN, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSONS: TRUMAN TO NIXON 7 (1975)
[hereinafter referred to as WOLANIN]. Marcy, in a shorter monograph, covered presiden-
tial commissions from the beginning of Theodore Roosevelt's terms as President through
1940. C. MARcY, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS (1945) [hereinafter referred to as MARcY]. See
generally F. POPPER, THE PRESIDENT'S COMbUSSIONS 63-64 (1970) for a discussion of
legislative-executive commissions as an alternative to presidential commissions
[hereinafter referred to as POPPER].
7 P.L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964); see text accompanying note 55 infra.
See notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text infra.
MARCY, supra note 6, at 23.
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ies."' 0 Yet they have been frequently used in the United States
since 1900 and were even used to some extent prior to that. The
commission sometimes cited as the first in the United States was
not an advisory commission. George Washington appointed a
presidential commission to help in settling the Whiskey Rebellion
of 1794." Although called a commission, it was more in the nature
of a three-man task force which had an action, rather than advi-
sory, mandate. From the start of Theodore Roosevelt's incum-
bency through the end of Calvin Coolidge's tenure, there were "no
less than 471 federal commissions, committees, boards and simi-
lar bodies created."'" Not to be outdone, Herbert Hoover ap-
pointed sixty-two commissions during his four years, and Frank-
lin Roosevelt appointed more than one hundred such bodies from
1933 through 1940.' 3 Between the start of President Truman's
incumbency in 1945 and the end of President Nixon's first term
in 1973, there were ninety-nine presidential advisory commis-
sions, not including joint legislative-executive commissions."
B. The Impact of Commissions
Part of the discredited image of commissions results from a
failure to comprehend the reasons for appointing a commission.
Harold Seidman suggests that presidents
employ committees and commissions to capture and contain the
opposition. . . .[that committees and commissions] can also offer
an immediate, visible response in times of national catastrophe
... .[that they] are employed as a kind of tranquilizer to quiet
public and congressional agitation . . . .Prestigious commissions
can also build public support for controversial courses of action.
What is wanted is endorsement, not advice .... 11
Elizabeth Drew identifies eight reasons for appointing commis-
sions:
1) to obtain the blessing of distinguished men for something you
want to do anyway;
Chase, The Longest Way from Thought to Action, THE REPORTER, June 22, 1961,
at 28. The quoted phrase in the text was originated by Henry Heald, formerly head of the
Ford Foundation.
POPPER, supra note 6, at 7.
" MAuc-, supra note 6, at 3-4.
13 Id.
SWoLANiN, supra note 6, at 205-15.
SSEIDMAN, supra note 1, at 23-24.
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2) to postpone action, yet be justified in insisting that you are at
work on the problem;
3) to act as a lightning rod, drawing political heat away from the
White House;
4) to conduct an extensive study of something you do need to know
more about before you act, in case you do;
5) to investigate, lay to rest rumors, and convince the public of one
particular set of facts;
6) to educate the commissioners, or get them aboard on something
you want to do;
7) because you cannot think of anything else to do; and
8) to change the hearts and minds of men."
It should be obvious that presidential commissions are often
used for political purposes. In fact, it has been charged that many
of the commissions appointed by President Hoover "were politi-
cal in character, meaning that they were devices for avoiding
taking a stand on controversial issues."' 7
Nevertheless, the primary purpose for most commissions is
"to formulate innovative domestic policies and to facilitate their
adoption," although "ducking issues" may also have been of
some importance as a reason for creating commissions, especially
those dealing with policy analysis. 8
It is still difficult to assign particular results to advisory com-
missions. They are reflective, rather than active, organizations
and, in this, they are criticized along with planning agencies,
interagency boards and councils, interstate compact commis-
sions, and, not to spare the Congress, nonlegislative committees.
Advisory commissions make their recommendations and then
disappear. If action eventually occurs, there are other active peo-
ple and organizations ready to claim parenthood. Nevertheless,
the record of commissions, though fuzzy, is not as bad as it may
appear, especially if those commissions whose purpose was to
avoid action are not considered.
By contrast, the English royal commissions have had a re-
markable record of achievement. They have been perhaps the
most important source of ideas for social reform in England,"
1 Drew, On Giving Oneself a Hotfoot: Government by Commission, ATLANTIc
MONTHLY, May 1968, at 45-46 [hereinafter referred to as Drew].
" MARcY, supra note 6, at 43-44.
" WOLANIN, supra note 6, at 11, 22.
The Royal Commission on the Poor Law and Relief of Distress of 1905 to 1909 was
VOL. 54
COMMISSIONS
though they are used less frequently than advisory commissions
in the United States." Appointment by the sovereign gives a
degree of separation and disinterest from the head of government
and makes the public, rather than the government, the client of
the royal commission.
One does not have to turn to royal commissions to find exam-
ples of commissions that have been successful in pointing the way
to new policies.2' One of these helped to establish what became
one of the categories of public lands later considered by the Pub-
lic Land Law Review Commission. Recognizing the severe prob-
lems in the Great Plains States caused by the Great Depression
and drought, Franklin Roosevelt in 1936 created a Special Com-
mittee on Farm Tenancy which was made up of government offi-
cials and representatives of the lay public. It was given two and
one-half months to report. The President suggested that the com-
mittee, which functionally was a commission, consult with two
members of Congress who had been working on the problem,
Senator John H. Bankhead and Representative Marvin Jones.
One observer remarked, "[T]here is no doubt but that the
Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937 owes its existence in
part, at least, to the work of the President's Committee. ' 22 On the
other hand, there was the famous Wickersham Commission, the
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, cre-
formed to deal with the laws relating to relief of poor persons that had been in effect for
three-quarters of a century since the time of the previous royal commission on poor laws.
The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 embodied the principles of the Royal Commission
on the Poor Law of 1832, which included a provision that still frames debate over welfare
policy: "That the public relief of destitution out of funds raised by taxation-as distin-
guished from the alms of the charitable-devitalized the recipients, degraded their char-
acter and induced in them general bad behavior." B. WEBB, OUa PARTNERSHIP 317-18
(1948).
Although the Royal Commission of 1832 may have been wrong when judged against
modern concepts of welfare, it nevertheless had an enormous impact.
POPPER, supra note 6, at 50.
2W Wolanin found that presidential support for commission recommendations and the
impact of these recommendations were surprisingly high. His analysis showed that 68%
of the commissions that were examined had received positive presidential support in the
form of a message, introduction of legislation, or administrative action on significant or
major recommendations of the commissions. Further analysis showed that 58% of the
commission reports ended up with significant or major recommendations that were, in
fact, implemented by legislative or administrative action. WoLANN, supra note 6, at 133-
39.
n MARcY, supra note 6, at 30.
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ated by President Hoover following a campaign pledge to deal
with the problems of prohibition, a pledge designed "to corral
both the wet and dry vote." That Commission's report was "an
unmitigated failure."
A former staff member of an advisory commission that has
been given high marks for effectiveness, the Outdoor Recreation
Resources Review Commission of 1959-1962 [ORRRC], gave four
reasons for its success: timing; nonpartisan membership; insist-
ence by the chairman, Laurance S. Rockefeller, that there be no
minority report; and the ability, with help from the Rockefeller
philanthropies, to find key people for report writing and funding
a strong follow-up effort.2' Two of these points, timing and the
consensus report, deserve some further comment.
An advisory commission has little control over either the
specific time at which its report is released or over the general
political circumstances into which its recommendations are
dropped. All commissions hope for front-page headlines on the
day of release, but most settle for less. Yet a report's public recep-
tion is determined to a great extent immediately following its
release. A more important consideration is whether the President,
the Congress, and the country are ready for the commission's
recommendations. Often, the failure of a commission may be due
to reasons lying beyond its control, such as the release of its
report.
ORRRC's report came at a time when outdoor recreation in
the country was booming, the states and federal land manage-
ment agencies were not able to cope with the surge of people to
the outdoors, and Congress was looking for answers. There was a
problem, and the Commission had new and relevant solutions.
Most commissions, not just ORRRC, seek to have unanimous
or consensus reports. 2 The price of gaining that consensus fre-
quently is fuzzy recommendations supported by generalities in a
report that lacks passion, none of which bodes well for convincing
the public, the Congress, or the President. The problem becomes
one of gaining too little attention for recommendations that may
Id. at 39, 40.
11 Conversation with Professor Hugh C. Davis, University of Massachusetts, former
staff member of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission.
2 Derthick, supra note 3, at 635.
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have the support of an entire commission, but are difficult to
translate into meaningful legislation or administrative action.
C. Why Commissions Are Appointed"
Five purposes served by advisory commissions may be identi-
fied and ranked according to their frequency of use:
1) Policy analysis: when the commission is expected to decide
what to do within the broad boundaries of nonradical federal action;
2) window dressing: when an "elite consensus" to support
presidential proposals is needed;
3) long range education: when calling public attention to
problems and creating "a frame of reference" for debating them is
desired;
4) crisis response: when something has to be done to show
recognition of a problem; and
5) issue management and avoidance: when the President
needs "to feel his way into a controversial, complex, or new area. ' '
Advisory commissions are not, of course, the only devices
available to presidents and the Congress for accomplishing these
purposes. White House Conferences, public hearings, presidential
trips, and various other means of capturing public attention can
further the purposes of window dressing, crisis response, and issue
management and avoidance. Government task forces, universi-
ties, and foundations or institutions, such as the National Acad-
emy of Sciences or the Brookings Institution can aid in policy
analysis or long range education. No single approach has a unique
ability to fulfill the assigned purposes. Advisory commissions do,
however, have some characteristics that are particularly well
suited for policy analysis and long range public education where
problems of government and public policies are involved.
First, they are outside the usual channels of government,
and, therefore, are blessed with a detached point of view. Second,
they are generally able to attract highly qualified members and
a staff of bright and diverse people who would not be available
in individual government agencies or could not be assembled to
serve on interagency task forces. Third, because commissions
often have the ear of the President or key members of Congress
See also text accompanying notes 15 and 16 supra.
WOLANIN, supra note 6, at 23.
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and remain independent, they are able to get information and
access to assistance that would not otherwise be available."
While advisory commissions may not be the best device for deal-
ing with some problems, they are well suited to work on matters
of public policy and administration, which are surely the kind of
issues that have faced public land commissions.29
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND COMMISSIONS
Prior to the Public Land Law Review Commission, there
were three commissions that dealt with public land issues: those
of 1879, 1903, and 1929. Each was important in focusing attention
on public land issues and abuses.
A. 1879
The first public lands commission in 1879 was established
because "Congress had gone on piling land law upon land law
. . . without considering how later legislation might affect or be
quite out of harmony with earlier laws which were not repealed."3
A movement to reform the land laws led Congress to authorize a
Commission made up of the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, the head of the Geological Survey, and three nongovern-
ment persons appointed by the President .3 One member of the
Commission, Commissioner Williamson of the General Land Of-
fice, importuned the Public Lands Committees of both houses of
the Congress to appoint three members each to participate in the
Commission, but neither house responded to this suggestion.32
Among the recommendations of the report of the Public
Land Commission of 1879 was a "proposal to classify the lands
. . . into arable, mineral, arid but irrigable, pasturage (for graz-
ing), and timberland . . . [but the report made] little effort to
establish criteria for classification or to determine how it was to
be achieved. '33 The 1879 Commission's conclusion and recom-
z, Id. at 38-53.
Derthick, supra note 3, at 635.
3 P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 422 (1968) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as GATES]. Similar reasons are given for establishing the PLLRC.
31 Id. at 423.
: Id. at 424.
3 Id. at 428. The PLLRC in its 1970 report also found that land classification was a
relevant issue and that it was easier to recommend that criteria for classification be
established than to specify the criteria. Hagenstein, One Third of the Nation's
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mendations were contained in a short forty-seven page report
signed by all members of the Commission, although one member,
Powell, added a two page statement with proposed modifications
on water and mineral rights. The report was accompanied by
proposed statutes that would implement the recommendations
and were more concrete than the recommendations, and four ad-
ditional volumes of background information."
B. 1903
The second Public Land Commission was appointed by Pres-
ident Theodore Roosevelt35 in 1903, after Congress had refused to
provide for a commission at Roosevelt's request, to consider
abuses of the Desert Land Act and other matters of concern. 6 The
three appointees were all government employees: Commissioner
of the General Land Office, Chief Engineer of the Reclamation
Service, and Gifford Pinchot, who at that time headed the Bu-
reau of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture. This Commis-
sion, which was highly critical of the Desert Land Act as making
possible the creation of large landed estates, again decided that
there was a need for land classification, which in this case would
assign some land for disposal and some for leasing of grazing
Land-Evolution of a Policy Recommendation, 12 NAT. RESOURCES J. 56-75 (1972)
[hereinafter referred to as Hagenstein I. This article details the PLLRC's approach to
land classification, which was the subject of considerable criticism by various detractors
from the Commission's report.
GATES, supra note 30, at 429.
Advisory commissions had been used as a governmental device only sparingly in
the nineteenth century, and "Theodore Roosevelt probably deserves the title of Father of
the Presidential Advisory Commission." WOLANIN, supra note 6, at 5. Although enthusias-
tic about his creation, Roosevelt found, much to his disgust, that the Congress had some
doubts about his authority to establish commissions. The National Conservation Commis-
sion and the Country Life Commission were appointed in 1908, and both served without
appropriated funds. When the report of the National Conservation Commission was trans-
mitted to Congress in 1909 with a request for $50,000: "[The President] was accommo-
dated not by an appropriation, but by an amendment to the Sundry Civil Act which
denied him any funds and also sought to prevent the appointment in the future of such
'unauthorized' commissions." MARCY, supra note 6, at 37-38. Similarly, Roosevelt asked
for $24,000 for the Country Life Commission "to digest the material it has collected" and
this request was refused, in part on the grounds that the President had no power to create
the Commission in the first place." Id. Congressional displeasure with Theodore Roose-
velt's Commissions is also illustrated by the fate of the report of the President's Home
Commission. It was attacked in Congress as being absurd, and a resolution was introduced
to exclude the report from the mails "as obscene literature unfit for circulation." Id. at
118.
3, GATES, supra note 30, at 488.
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rights. 7 The Commission's recommendations, with one limited
exception, were disregarded by the Congress, which resisted
Roosevelt's lecturing it on matters involving conservation. 8 In
contrast to other presidential commissions, the Public Land
Commission of 1903, which did not have nongovernment mem-
bers, might instead be viewed as an interagency task force having
somewhat less standing than the usual blue-ribbon advisory com-
mission with public members.
The first Roosevelt's relations with the Congress in general
may have helped to determine the congressional reaction to his
commissions. Although for a time they may have been less in-
clined to create commissions without approval of the Congress,
those who followed Roosevelt as President were not greatly de-
terred in the use of presidential commissions to achieve their
ends.
C. 1929
In 1929 President Hoover had concluded that, "For the best
interest of the people as a whole, and people of the western states
and the small farmers and stockmen by whom they are primarily
used, [the public lands] should be managed and the policies for
their use determined by state governments."39 He asked Congress
for authority to appoint a commission to study what to do with
the public domain and was duly authorized to appoint a Commit-
tee on the Conservation and Administration of the Public Do-
main. He appointed as chairman James R. Garfield, who had
been Secretary of the Interior under Theodore Roosevelt, and
eighteen other public members, in addition to the Secretaries of
Agriculture and the Interior who were ex officio members of the
Committee. Reflecting Hoover's views, the Committee recom-
mended that those public lands important for national interest
purposes should be retained, that the states should be offered the
remainder of the public lands and given them when prepared to
provide administrative control, and that those lands not accepted
by the states should be placed under organized federal manage-
ment.4 0
11 B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND PouclEs 432 (1924); GATES, supra note
30, at 489-91.
GATES, supra note 30, at 491-92.
"' Id. at 524.
3' Id. at 525-26.
VOL. 54
COMMISSIONS
Congress was sufficiently interested in the expected results
of this presidential commission that it asked that the report be
transmitted to the Congress." The old Roosevelt conservationists,
in Senate hearings, voiced opposition to the transfer of federal
lands to the states and unwillingness on the part of at least some
of the western states to accept federal lands without mineral
rights. 2 The result was that the Committee's recommendations
were not enacted, although its report helped set the stage for
passage in 1934 of the Taylor Grazing Act.
III. THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION
A. Formation
The Public Land Law Review Commission was the fourth
advisory commission in 100 years to make recommendations on
public land policies. Congressman Wayne N. Aspinall, then
Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the
House of Representatives, wrote President John F. Kennedy in
October 1962, saying,
I think that any student of the public lands situation will recognize
that we have reached a point where it is essential to establish clear-
cut legislative guidelines concerning the management, use, and dis-
position of our public lands. This has come about because of past
inaction of Congress, coupled with the growing scarcity of land in
the United States and the parallel need to preserve some of our
undisturbed areas in their natural setting.1
3
In his reply, President Kennedy noted that
the public land laws constitute a voluminous, even forbidding, body
of policy determinations within which the land management agen-
" MARcy, supra note 6, at 27.
2 GATES, supra note 30, at 527-28.
3 Letter from Wayne N. Aspinall to John F. Kennedy (Oct. 15, 1962), reprinted in
COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 2d Srss., THE PUBLIc LAND LAW
REVIEW COMMISSION 121 (Comm. Print 1964).
About the time of his letter to the President, Congressman Aspinall was noting that
the Public Lands Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
would have only "between 90 and 100 hours [during the 88th Congress] in which to
consider all of the matters within its jurisdiction." Address by Wayne N. Aspinall, West-
ern Regional District of the National Association of Counties (Dec. 12, 1962), reprinted
in COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 2d SEss., THE PuBLIc LAND LAW
REVIEW COMMISSION 28 (Comm. Print 1964). Given the scope of public land issues de-
scribed by Aspinall as needing attention, Congress would clearly be hard put to deal with
them in its committees in the thorough manner that they deserved.
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cies must operate. Dating back as much as a century and a half, this
complex of statutory guidelines varies from the most detailed pre-
scription of ministerial acts to mere definition of an objective cou-
pled with broad grants of discretion to administrators. Viewed in
this perspective, the deficiencies of the present structure become
apparent."
In these "two strong and patriotic statements,"" the founda-
tion was laid for the creation of the Public Land Law Review
Commission. The result was "the most searching assessment, the
most fundamental public exposure and discussion ever concen-
trated on a broad natural resource issue."4
Responding to a growing national interest in recreation and
preservation of natural values on the public lands, the adm'nis-
trative agencies, under the broad grants of authority referred to
by President Kennedy, were increasingly restricting economic
uses of these lands. These uses-mining, grazing, and log-
ging-had strong local constituencies from which western mem-
bers of Congress derived much of their support and which pro-
vided grist for the legislative mills of the Interior and Insular
Affairs Committees. At least some members of the Interior Com-
mittees realized that they were unable to slow the administrative
agencies against which they were arrayed and which had the
discretionary authority ultimately to bring economic uses of the
public lands to a halt. As Chairman of the House Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee, Aspinall was looking for a way to
place some of the control over public land decisions back in the
Congress and especially in his Committee.
Given the various resources available to the Congress for
developing information on legislative matters, as well as the low
esteem with which commissions are sometimes held, the choice
of a commission as the mechanism for reviewing public land is-
sues is perhaps surprising.47 It is obvious, however, that assigning
,1 Letter from John F. Kennedy to Wayne N. Aspinall (Jan. 17, 1963), reprinted in
COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 88rH CONG., 2d SESS., THE PUBLIC LAND LAW
REVIEW COMMISSION 121 (Comm. Print 1964).
11 John A. Carver, Jr. (unpublished paper), Public Land Law Review Regional Con-
ference, Syracuse, New York (Dec. 14, 1970).
'*Id.
By August 1963, Aspinall had settled on a congressional-executive commission as
the mechanism necessary for "a complete review of all laws and regulations affecting
Federal public land ownership and the natural resources thereof," which would have three
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the necessary studies and review to the executive branch would
not do; after all, the executive branch was in part the subject of
the review. Aspinall explored other possible institutional havens
for the task, including what was then the Legislative Reference
Service of the Library of Congress, but the resources necessary for
a major effort of this sort could not be made available in ongoing
institutions.48 A temporary commission was required."
Although there are remarkable similarities in some of the
words used to describe the problems facing this and its predeces-
sor commissions, as well as in the kinds of recommendations that
were made, there are also important differences. First of all, the
initiative for creation of the PLLRC came from the Congress
rather than from the Executive. It was Congressman Aspinall
who, as a representative from a public land district in Colorado,
most acutely felt the contrasting development and preservation
pressures on the public lands. In one sense it was western con-
gressmen who had most to gain through a revision of the public
land laws that would provide a more rational system of allocating
public lands to conflicting uses and one that would satisfy, even
if only for a time, the various interests clamoring for their votes.
Second, this was not a presidential commission. It was made
up of members of Congress, appointed by the Speaker of the
House and President of the Senate, as well as appointees of the
and one-half years to make the necessary study and prepare a report. Remarks before the
Section of Mineral and Natural Resources Law, at the American Bar Association Annual
Meeting, Chicago, Illinois (Aug. 14, 1963).
11 Interview with Theodore M. Schad, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Con-
gress, in 1964-65. Schad recalled Congressman Aspinall's inquiry.
Advisory commissions, nevertheless, "face a formidable set of tasks." They must:
- translate their mandates into operational terms;
- recruit a competent staff;
- establish their own credibility through background studies, public hear-
ings, and visits to relevant locations;
- reach a consensus on recommendations; and
- put forth these recommendations in a report that will capture public
attention and at the same time show such understanding of the problems
faced that the proposed solutions are convincing.
WOLANIN, supra note 6, at 96.
Wolanin found many similarities in the presidential advisory commissions that he
examined, which covered the period from 1945 to 1973, and found that little change in
commission work had taken place during this time. Id. at 123. With the only major
exception of the important joint legislative-executive character of the PLLRC, its opera-
tions fall into the patterns recognized by Wolanin for presidential advisory commissions.
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President. It was to consider problems that faced both branches
of the Federal Government and that involved fundamental issues
of the separation of legislative and executive powers. All three of
the previous public land commissions, as well as most other advi-
sory commissions that have been appointed since 1900, were pres-
idential in terms of appointees and character." The PLLRC had
members not appointed by the President, and it reported to the
Congress as well as to the President.
The reasons for the joint legislative-executive form of the
Public Land Law Review Commission were several. Participation
by the Executive Branch in this predominantly congressional ef-
fort was necessary to give the Commission credibility with recrea-
tion and preservation interests and to illustrate commitment of
the Executive Branch to its recommendations.
In addition, choice of this form was based in part on the
performance of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Com-
mission, whose report had only recently been released. The struc-
ture of ORRRC was similar to that of the PLLRC and it was
viewed as a remarkably successful commission." Congressman
Aspinall had been a member of ORRRC, along with three other
members of the House of Representatives, four members of the
Senate, and seven Presidential appointees.
Third, the scope of the PLLRC study was broader than that
of its predecessors, encompassing all federal lands, rather than
just the remaining unreserved and unappropriated public domain
lands. The intent also was clearly not limited to a codification of
the public land laws, but rather concentrated upon a full-scale
review of the law, policies, and practices governing the disposal,
retention, and management of these lands.2 If a more limited
purpose for the Commission was understood by some, it was not
evident in the law that established it.
50 Wolanin's definition of a presidential advisory commission is one that is inter alia
"advisory to the President . . . all members of which are appointed directly by the
President, . . . [and] at least one member of which is public .... " Id. at 7.
1, Its report led directly to the creation of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation and the
Land and Water Conservation Fund, and its study reports were important as sources of
new and well-organized information. See generally Wolfe, Perspective on Outdoor Recrea-
tion: A Bibliographical Survey, 54 GEOGRAPHICAL Rav. 203 (1964).
12 P.L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1400 (1970)).
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Finally, the time and effort devoted to this review far ex-
ceeded that of previous public land commissions." The initial
authorization of $4 million in funds and slightly over four years
in which to report was later extended to a total funding authoriza-
tion of $7,390,000 and a total time of almost six years. 4
B. The Commission Itself
A commission sets the tone of its work through selection of a
chairman and a staff director, the attention it gives to its work
and report, and its willingness to agree on consensus recommen-
dations. The PLLRC had nineteen members: six Senators and six
Representatives, all ranking members for the respective Commit-
tees on Interior and Insular Affairs and with equal majority and
minority party representation, six presidential appointees, and a
chairman chosen by the other eighteen."
The Chairman was Congressman Wayne N. Aspinall of Colo-
rado, Chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Com-
mittee, and there was no question that he was the dominant
figure on the Commission. It was his idea originally, he was given
broad operational latitude by the other members, and the Staff
Director reported directly to him. Yet, the recommendations of
the PLLRC, as is common with commissions generally, repre-
sented a broadly agreeable consensus. Members of the Commis-
sion accepted the idea that only a consensus report would be
likely to have a significant impact, but perhaps more important
was the fact that involvement in the Commission's work tended
to develop a similar set of experiences with respect to public land
policies that affected the Chairman's views as well as those of the
other members.
Although the public members of the Commission initially
had less extensive knowledge of the policy issues facing them than
did at least some of the congressional members, as time went on
'1 Even after allowing for a year of delay before the Commission held its first meeting
in July 1965, the time and funds allowed for the Commission's work were handsome
compared to those allowed for earlier commissions. On the other hand, they were not
overly generous when compared with those allotted to other advisory commissions of its
time. The National Water Commission, established in 1968, had a more limited mandate,
but was given five years and $5 million with which to do its work. P.L. No. 90-515, 82
Stat. 868 (1968).
P.L. No. 90-213, 81 Stat. 660 (1967).
" P.L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964).
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they began to exert greater influence on the Commission's find-
ings and recommendations. Not only were the public members
able to spend more time at the Commission meetings than were
many of the congressional members, but each of them was also a
swing vote in the sense that each had little previous public com-
mitment to positions on specific issues before the Commission.
Some congressional members found it difficult to separate
their public posture in committee hearings and with constituents
from the private deliberations at the Commission meetings. Oth-
ers, however, found the Commission meetings to be a congenial
forum for developing statesmanship. One congressional member
made the point clearly when he said during a private session:
As a representative of the fine people of the sovereign state of ,
I must oppose in no uncertain terms this hare-brained proposal,
which would lead to disaster and confusion throughout my state.
But, as a member of the Public Land Law Review Commission, I
applaud the highmindedness of this statesmanlike approach and
urge my fellow members to join me in voting for it."
The consensus nature of the Commission's recommendations
made it possible for congressional members to rise above the need
to satisfy voters in the district on each issue.
C. The Advisory Council
The Act that created the PLLRC also established an Advi-
sory Council of twenty-five members appointed by the Commis-
sion who were to be "representative of the various major citizens'
groups interested in problems . . .of the public lands"57 and
departmental liason officers from major agencies with public land
responsibilities. It also directed the Commission to invite each
Governor to appoint a representative to the Commission.58 The
Act further specified some sixteen categories of interests to be
represented, at a minimum, on the Advisory Council.59
Paraphrased from the author's notes from an executive session of the Commission.
P.L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964).
NId.
' Id. The Act identified the following major citizen groups to be included among
those represented on the Advisory Council: organizations representative of state and local
government, private organizations working in the field of public land management and
outdoor recreation resources and opportunities, landowners, forestry interests, livestock
interests, mining interests, oil and gas interests, commercial outdoor recreation interests,
industry, education, labor, and public utilities.
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Advisory Council members and Governors' Representatives
met with the Commission at two planning meetings during the
early stages of its work, in a series of eleven public meetings
throughout the country between June 1966, and April 1968, and
at a series of meetings to consider study reports and policy alter-
natives beginning in November 1968. In addition, written views
of the "official family" were solicited throughout the Commis-
sion's life.
The PLLRC Act specified that the Advisory Council was to
"advise and counsel the Commission concerning matters within
[its] jurisdiction"' " and indeed this is what the Advisory Council
did during the Commission's active life.' Advisory Council mem-
bers, acting as individuals or representing their constituencies,
were generally helpful in providing information and suggesting
directions that might be taken by the Commission.
Beyond this, it was the stated hope of Chairman Aspinall
that, on release of the Commission's report, each member of the
Advisory Council would advise the groups that he represented
that the Commission's recommendations necessarily reflected a
balancing of the various interests and that his constituents had
fared as well as could be expected. It was also hoped that each
member of the Advisory Council would be able to muster the
support of the groups he represented for legislative proposals
growing out of the Commission's recommendations.62
It is not at all clear that the members saw themselves as representing the categories
of interests specified in the PLLRC Act, although with some mental gymnastics, at least
one member of the Advisory Council could be fit into each of the specified categories.
Nevertheless, one of the respondents to my letter to Advisory Council members denied
that he represented any groups to the Commission, although he noted considerable knowl-
edge of two of the important categories specified in the Act. A second respondent, in
defining his understanding of his own representation on the Advisory Council, generally
agreed.
P.L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964).
Although the Commission itself resisted efforts of the Advisory Council to organize
as a formal body competing with the Commission, the relationship between them was
cooperative and cordial.
" To determine how well Advisory Council members performed these latter two func-
tions, which they may not have clearly perceived or accepted as appropriate functions, I
wrote seventeen members of the Advisory Council, asking to what extent they had coun-
seled their constituency groups to support the Commission's recommendations and to
what extent they had attempted to muster support for legislative proposals that grew out
of the recommendations. Of the seven responses, most suggested that they, as individuals,
saw their role primarily in terms of advising the Commission and not in counseling consti-
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In the year following publication of the Commission's report,
Chairman Aspinall introduced a bill, H.R. 7211, which incorpo-
rated many of the Commission's recommendations and was in-
tended to set the policy framework for other legislation that
would be introduced later. Five days of hearings were held, during
which two former members of the Advisory Council presented
oral statements and two other former members submitted written
statements. One oral statement indicated support for most of the
Commission recommendations, but disagreement with many of
the provisions of H.R. 7211. One written statement indicated
support for the bill as an outgrowth of the Commission's report.
The other two statements did not relate the bill to the Commis-
sion's recommendations. 3
This sample for judging the effectiveness of the Advisory
Council following submission of the Commission's report is ad-
mittedly limited. Furthermore, a number of Advisory Council
members assisted in Commission-sponsored regional meetings to
acquaint interested groups and people with the recommenda-
tions. It appears, however, that hopes that the Advisory Council
members would lobby their constituencies for the Commission's
approach and recommendations once the report had been filed
were not well founded, for Advisory Council members were cho-
sen by members of the Commission, and to some degree there was
an understanding on the part of Advisory Council members that
they were the nominees of particular Commission members. This
undoubtedly affected their perception of responsibilities to the
Commission and the channels through which they could operate
most effectively.
D. The Staff
Commission staffs are often seen as exerting an undue influ-
ence over a commission's work, its recommendations, and its re-
port. There is sometimes tension between a commission and its
tuency groups. Three of the responses indicated that an effort was made to help consti-
tuency groups interpret the Commission's recommendations, but none of the three indi-
cated any effort to gain support for them. Only one of the responses indicated efforts were
made to support legislation that grew out of the Commission's report. Responses are
treated confidentially in appreciation for the willingness of Advisory Council members to
participate in the survey.
Public Land Policy Act of 1971: Hearings on H.R. 7211 Before the Subcomm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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staff and a suspicion of commission staffs by interested consti-
tuencies of the commission. Two common sources of tension be-
tween a commission and its staff are fear by commissions that
some staff members are "overzealous for social reform, with a
corresponding bias emerging in their work" and suspicion in
"formally bipartisan commissions . . . that top staff members
are really very partisan." 4
Fears that staff, however qualified and persuasive its mem-
bers may be, will dominate a commission are generally not well
founded. While staffs generally write commission reports, mem-
bers of the commission have a decisive influence on their content
because most commission members are actively involved in the
decisions leading up to the report, they have considerable oppor-
tunity to review and comment on report drafts, and they are
generally "strong-minded and intelligent. "15
It is true to a degree in most commissions that "the staff is
often composed of young, less experienced people who still think
the world can and should be changed; the commissioners know
better." 6 More accurately, however, "[niot only are the views of
commission members often broadened and liberalized [by the
commission experience], but those of the staff are often moder-
ated and tempered."67 The very context in which a commission
operates places the commission and its staff in a relationship that
is separate from what is happening in government in general. In
the end, the names of the staff members, as well as those of the
commission, appear on the commission reports. Both are staking
their reputations on having a good report, and neither commis-
sioners nor staff members are well served by divisiveness.
Although the total number of staff of the PLLRC at one time
grew to forty-eight members, the basic work of preparing policy
materials for Commission meetings and writing the final report
was the responsibility of six members of the "senior staff." The
Lipsky & Olson, Riot Commission Politics, in PoLmCs/AME'CA: THE CurriNG EDGE
OF CHANGE 198 (W. Burnam ed. 1963).
WOLANIN, supra note 6, at 111-15.
" Drew, supra note 16, at 48.
,' WOLANIN, supra note 6, at 117 (footnote omitted). Wolanin also notes that commis-
sion staffs by their very background tend "toward a method of problem solving . . . of
making pragmatic adjustments and modifications in the existing programs and ap-
proaches." Id. at 101, 117. This is particularly true of senior staff members.
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identification of this senior staff during the life of the Commission
was based in part on their skills and knowledge of the issues, but
equally important was their ability to work with the Commission
and express Commission decisions in a way that reflected fairly
the views of the Commission. Partisan party views were not an
issue with respect to the staff of this "formally nonpartisan" com-
mission since the issues that it faced did not divide on party lines
as much as on regional or substantive grounds.
Of more importance to the Advisory Council and other inter-
est groups was the perception that the staff served as a screen
between them and the Commission. The Advisory Council saw its
function as providing advice to the Commission, not to the staff.
Commission members were not always available at and between
meetings, but the staff was available. To some extent, whatever
concerns Advisory Council members may have had regarding the
staff were mitigated by their access to the Commission members
who had championed their nominations to the Advisory Council.
E. Public Meetings
Some 900 witnesses were heard at the Commission's regional
public meetings held at 16 locations throughout the country and
at most meetings, tours of nearby public lands were arranged for
members of the Commission, staff, Advisory Council, and Gover-
nors' Representatives. Little new information was developed at
the public meetings, especially for congressional members of the
Commission who had attended numerous committee hearings on
the same subjects. The meetings, however, served three very use-
ful purposes.
First, they gave interested people in each region a chance to
be heard regarding the problems as they viewed them and to have
a sense of participation in the Commission's work. Second, they
gave the Commission's "official family" a firsthand chance to see
some public land problem situations. But the most important
purpose was the common experience that they built among the
official family. During the decisionmaking stages of its life, when
the Commission met in Washington, there were numerous instan-
ces when illustrations were drawn from these experiences together
at the public meetings. This united the Commission on issues on




Thirty-three subjects were studied, mostly under outside
contract, and reports were prepared for the Commission. Most
subject areas included studies of the existing legal structure for
use and management and the resource characteristics and status
of the public lands relative to the subject. By the time the study
program was concluded, seven feet of study reports had been
prepared. "Massive" is a reasonable adjective to describe the
study program. Unfortunately, its usefulness to the Commission
was limited.
To a considerable extent the study program served a political
rather than an analytical purpose. The scope and detail of the
study reports offered convincing evidence that the Commission
had explored every nook and cranny of the public lands and the
laws, policies, regulations, and practices that determine their
administration. They also provided the Commission with organ-
ized statements of the law and with resources data that might
otherwise have been difficult to assemble readily when the Com-
mission was writing its report. But there was little in these reports
in the way of ideas to help the Commission and staff in defining
new and better approaches to solving public land issues."
A handful of the study reports were very well done, although
even these had limited analytical value for the Commission.
Some of the reports were at best mediocre. There are two explana-
tions for this occurrence. First, the contractors were asked to
provide only facts without any new ideas, because the Commis-
sion did not want itself to be cornered by the forceful presentation
of a particular policy option favored by a contractor.
Second, the size and scope of individual studies, the rela-
tively short time in which they had to be completed, and their
emphasis on simple data collection and organization, as well as
the nature of the government contracting process, made it very
difficult to get a truly outstanding study team to take a contract.
The notable successes among the studies were most often those
U The PLLRC was like many other commissions, most of whose recommendations
"might be considered by many to be old hat and a collection of tired clich~s . .. [but
which nevertheless] represent substantial departures in policy when viewed in the context
of the normal pace of change and the range of line policy alternatives within the federal
government." WoLANiN, supra note 6, at 128.
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with a narrow focus and where the responsibility for the report fell
on one person. The reports that were less well done usually in-
volved both legal and resources materials and were prepared by
a team of assorted private consultants, practicing attorneys, and
academics.
G. Policy Evaluation and Final Report
Decisions by the Commission on public land policy matters
before it were made at a series of nineteen Commission meetings
during the sixteen months prior to sending the final report to the
printer. Each meeting included one and a half or two days of
executive sessions of the Commission and its senior staff. Review-
ing drafts of the Commission's final report was limited to the last
six or seven meetings. Major decisions by the Commission were
made on the basis of "policy evaluation papers"69 prepared and
presented by senior staff for each major subject. When policy
evaluations and decisions for each of the thirty-three subjects
facing the Commission had been completed, there was not only
a foundation for drafting the Commission's report, but there was
a clear understanding of what the report would say and how it
would be said. The policy evaluation process was the linchpin of
the Commission's efforts. Several points with regard to this pro-
cess are worth noting.
The policy evaluation papers set the agenda for Commission
decisions 0 and preparing them was a function of the staff. The
staff did not influence the Commission by whispering in mem-
bers' ears or standing between the Commission and its Advisory
Council. It did influence the Commission's report by deciding on
the order in which decisions would be presented to the Commis-
sion and by phrasing the questions that had to be answered.
The second point was the decision, reflecting the pragmatic
character of the Commission and its staff, to leave the decisions
0 These policy evaluation papers, typically 40 to 60 pages in length, were structured
by the staff to provide the Commission with a series of "yes or no" questions. The Commis-
sion's answers were based on a good deal of discussion among themselves and with the
senior staff and in many cases were shaded to achieve consensus and to recognize the
ambiguities of public land issues. Together, they provided an excellent basis for defining
a set of policy recommendations for each subject. Hagenstein I, supra note 33, describes
in some detail how this process worked for one major recommendation and its corollaries.
70 How the agenda for Commission decisions flavored its recommendations is covered
in another paper. Hagenstein I, supra note 33, especially at 66-75.
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on grand policy designs to the last. If meaningful consensus were
to be achieved, it would come not on grand declarations of policy,
but rather on the details of those policies. The Commission's
report starts with "A Program for the Future," seventeen general
recommendations and four "fundamental premises" on which the
report was based.7 These general recommendations did not
frame, but rather were drawn from, the 137 major recommenda-
tions in the report.
Finally, during the concluding series of six or seven Commis-
sion meetings, the draft report was read aloud, word by word, by
the Staff Director to the assembled Commission. Changes were
voted on and made by the Commission as the reading progressed.
This procedure, which is often used by commissions, enables sup-
porters of the Commission's report to point out that every mem-
ber had a full opportunity to read the report and influence its
content. It also focuses attention on the specific content, rather
than the general tone, of the report. If the PLLRC report7" is seen
as uneven, this may well be the result of the decision-by-decision
and page-by-page way in which it was prepared.
H. The Follow-up
The very facts of independence and limited duration that are
of great value to a commission in pursuing its work are a hind-
rance when it comes to doing the follow-up that is necessary if
recommendations are to be effected. Commission recommenda-
tions and reports are "orphans."73 They are cast adrift in a sea of
ongoing agencies, programs, and issues that are competing for
attention. The lack of mechanisms for follow-up to commission
recommendations is a matter of some recent concern to the Gen-
eral Accounting Office.74
Following submission of the PLLRC report to the President
and the Congress in June 1970, the Commission had six months
of life remaining. It sponsored a series of regional public meetings
1' PuBac LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 1-7 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT].
72 PLLRC REPORT, supra note 71.
13 WoLAI, supra note 6, at 157.
71 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BErER FoLLowup SYSTEM NEEDED TO DEAL WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS BY STUDY COMMISSIONS IN THE FEsAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL (1975) [hereinafter cited as USGAO].
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to gain the attention of "opinion makers."75 Members of the Com-
mission and its official family were key participants in these
meetings, which also served as forums for debating the recom-
mendations, and some momentary attention for the PLLRC's
recommendations was achieved.
In presenting the Commission's report to President Nixon,
Chairman Aspinall noted "the preparations being made by the
public land management agencies to review the report"7 and
welcomed a recent statement by the Attorney General that the
Justice Department would assume a leadership role in developing
by 1976 "a complete and modern statutory code for . . .our
public land resources."" However, no systematic effort by the
executive branch to implement the Commission's recommenda-
tions has occurred and, despite a formal analysis by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture that was sent to the White House in July
1970, the "executive branch has not designated an action agency
or official to formulate an overall policy or plan.""8 The Bicen-
tennial Year came and went without a sighting of the promised
Department of Justice public lands code.
Although the PLLRC reported to President Nixon, was con-
ceived during President Kennedy's term, and had its public
members appointed by President Johnson, it had no home in the
White House. Its recommendations, many of which were critical
of the way in which the laws were being administered, did not
have the enthusiastic support of the public land management
agencies.
Chairman Aspinall stated at various times that once the
Commission finished its work, the next step would be up to the
Congress. And so, in a way, it was; but six months went by before
the next Congress convened. The Commission had done no draft-
ing of possible legislation. It had not even gone so far as to suggest
how the recommendations might be packaged in legislative pro-
posals. Because of the complexity of the issues and their interrela-
tions, packaging the recommendations was a matter of substance.
Finally, some three months after the ninety-second Congress con-
+' PLLRC REPORT, supra note 71, at 307.
Public Land Law Review Commission, Press Release, June 23, 1970.
"Id.
,' USGAO, supra note 74, at 5.
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vened and nine months after the Commission's report had been
filed, H.R. 7211, a bill that put a number of Commission recom-
mendations in a cumbersome package, was introduced by Chair-
man Aspinall. The bill in its entirety had a constituency of one,
Chairman Aspinall7 and he was never able to bring H.R. 7211
to a floor vote. 0 Faced with its own problems of timing, elections,
and politics, the Congress is not the place to center responsibility
for follow-up.8 '
Lack of a follow-up mechanism for the PLLRC does not
mean that the Commission's recommendations have not had
some impact. The Bureau of Land Management Organic Act
2
enacted during the ninety-fourth Congress contains much that
appeared in the PLLRC report and in H.R. 7211. The Joint
Federal-State Land Use Planning Commission for Alaska histori-
cally is tied to the Commission's report. Other recommendations
have appeared in legislation and administrative orders. To attrib-
ute these actions solely to the persuasiveness of the Commission's
report and the soundness of its ideas would be exaggeration, but
there can be no doubt that the terms of the dialogue leading up
to these actions were influenced by the PLLRC.
IV. ARE COMMISSIONS A VIABLE DEVICE FOR INSTIGATING CHANGE?
A. Commission Form
Form must follow function, and the form of advisory commis-
sions should follow the purposes for which they are established.s8
" Even that constituency lost its power when Chairman Aspinall was defeated in a
primary election toward the end of the 92d Congress.
Hagenstein, Changing an Anachronism: Congress and the General Mining Law of
1872, 13 NAT. REsOURCES J. 480, 492 (1973).
11 By contrast, following publication of the report of the Outdoor Recreation Re-
sources Review Commission, a Citizens' Committee on the ORRRC report was estab-
lished, following a model provided by the follow-up to the Hoover Commissions on govern-
ment organization. POPPER, supra note 6, at 47. Funds were provided through Laurance
S. Rockefeller, who had been Chairman of ORRRC, and a small full-time staff was hired.
The Citizens' Committee is believed by many to have had a significant effect in getting
the ORRRC recommendations put into law.
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (West Supp. 1977).
For example, the Senate Select Committee on National Water Resources of 1959-
61, in effect a congressional commission, had a "considerable influence" on national water
policies. Schad, An Analysis of the Work of the Senate Select Committee on National
Water Resources, 1959-1961, 2 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 226, 247 (1962). An alternative sugges-
tion is that the appropriate client for advisory commissions is "the public" and not the
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In a broad sense, the function of an advisory commission as a
policy analyst is two-fold: It must analyze and it must promote
its results in a political context. If the results are to be effected
through presidential action, including in many cases the develop-
ment and submission of legislation, a presidential commission is
a suitable approach. Where the problems are seen as largely
within the purview of Congress, a legislative commission may be
more appropriate. The joint legislative-executive form of the
PLLRC was appropriate for the issues that it faced, which pene-
trated deeply into the matter of the appropriate separation of
legislative and executive responsibilities.
There seems to be a common, but unfounded, presumption
that having members of Congress on a commission will help pave
the way for any legislative proposals that may ensue. For one
thing, being party to a commission's report does not bind a mem-
ber to support its recommendations. 4 In addition, members of
Congress face the realities of change. Although only one of the
thirteen congressional members of the Commission failed to serve
in the Congress following release of the Commission's report, six
more, including the Chairman, had dropped by the wayside in the
next Congress, the ninety-third. Today, only two members of the
PLLRC, the Chairmen of the Senate Energy and Natural Re-
sources Committee and the House Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee, remain in Congress.
Having congressional experience and viewpoints on a com-
mission, on the other hand, is valuable. The congressional mem-
bers initially brought a better understanding of public land issues
to the PLLRC deliberations than did the public members. But
the fact that they were elected officials in itself added little to the
credibility of the Commission's report and, as noted above, 5 did
little in the end to smooth the path of its recommendations
through the Congress.
President who created the commission. Therefore, commissions should be a joint responsi-
bility of the President, the Congress, and even the Supreme Court, and serve much as the
royal commissions in England. POPPER, supra note 6, at 63. The PLLRC was a joint
legislative-executive advisory commission which saw its client not as the public, but as
the institutions of the Congress and the Presidency.
" Within 48 hours of the release of the PLLRC report, one of the Commission's
influential congressional members denounced the report roundly and disassociated him-
self from some of its major recommendations.
See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
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The idea that having presidential appointees on a largely
congressional commission would somehow tie the executive
branch to the Commission's recommendations also seems to have
been ill-founded. Even if the Nixon administration, to which the
PLLRC reported in 1970, had been interested in the recommen-
dations of a commission with Johnson appointees, it is not likely
that it would have believed itself committed to recommendations
that favored greater congressional control over public lands.
Administrative agencies have an increasingly national consti-
tuency whose interests are at odds with those of the production-
oriented constituency of the congressional committee members.M
That the administrative agencies should change their views be-
cause of the recommendations of a handful of presidential ap-
pointees on a largely congressional commission in the absence of
compelling reasons is not plausible.
B. Commission Membership and Operation
Commission members are chosen because of their compe-
tency and knowledge of issues facing the commission, their per-
ceived ability to represent important constituencies, and their
public visibility for adding to the report's credibility. Member-
ship should also be balanced in terms of geography, constituen-
cies, and viewpoints. The critical choice, though, is that of the
chairman. Those who never see a commisson's report will have a
perception of its contents consistent with their understanding of
his views.
The membership of the PLLRC met the above criteria. It was
bipartisan; the Senate and House members were equally divided
between the majority and minority and were the senior members
of the two Interior and Insular Affairs Committees. As such, they
were knowledgeable about public land matters and were, with
three exceptions, from western public land states. Three of the
presidential appointees, all of whom could be described as conser-
vationists, were from the East; the other three, one of whom
generally voted with the conservationists, were from the West.
They included a state official, a local official, a professional re-
source manager, a national conservation figure, a practicing at-
m See text following note 46 supra.
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torney, and a professor, and one was a Republican-all together
a collection typical of advisory commissions.
Chairman Aspinall was the dominant influence on the Com-
mission for two reasons, neither of which was expressed in an
overt attempt to dominate.87 His knowledge of the issues, gained
through eleven terms in the Congress, some six of which were as
Chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee,
was more extensive and detailed than that of any other commis-
sioner. The second reason is that the Chairman, in very typical
congressional fashion, was allowed to dominate simply because
he was Chairman. In the frenetic atmosphere of the Congress,
chairmen are assigned tasks and then allowed to pursue them
much as they see fit.
Among congressional members of the PLLRC, there seemed
to be two attitudes. For several, especially those who had other
significant responsibilities, the attitude was one of "The Commis-
sion is Wayne's baby and I am not going to interfere." If there
were doubts about the Commission's direction, the tendency was
one of not bucking the Chairman in the Commission, but waiting
until the issues came out in the Congress.8 8 As for those who were
not holding their fire for later, they appeared to be willing to
follow the Chairman's lead in any case.
Whenever members of Congress also serve on advisory com-
missions, it is probably unrealistic to expect that they will act
much differently or follow a different set of rules than in their
roles in the Congress. If this is the case, as the example of the
PLLRC seems to suggest, one might well ask if the Congress
should not appoint public members to represent it on joint
legislative-executive commissions, just as presidential appointees
are drawn from the public. 9 Given the overloaded schedule of
11 Chairman Aspinall stated his position or voted on issues in only the rare instances
when the other members were evenly divided.
0 This is suggested in part by the fact that only one congressional member of the
Commission joined with three of the six presidential appointees in the only significant
dissent filed with the Commission's report.
0 Popper, in his favored scheme of having national advisory commissions that report
to the public, specifically suggests that each branch appoint members, "none of whom




most members of Congress, this approach would surely have some
advantages, as well as some disadvantages.
The fact is that presidents have done rather well in choosing
commission members from their national constituency. Blue rib-
bon commissions typically have blue ribbon members and the
PLLRC was no exception. Presidential appointees to commis-
sions are drawn from a "distinctively national elite" and tend to
be cosmopolitan, rather than parochial, in viewpoint. 0 They
usually have achieved national recognition and view themselves
as representing national viewpoints.
Members of Congress, on the other hand, represent largely
local constituencies and bring a different, and useful, perspective
to commissions such as the PLLRC. One might well question
whether the Congress, if asked to make public appointees to
legislative-executive commissions, would be able to do as well as
the President in making appointments from a national consti-
tuency or to improve on its own members in representing local
constituencies.
C. Timing and Policy Context
Advisory commissions do have a finite life span, which can
have important implications. In fact, as noted earlier, some com-
missions are established to study issues with the hope that the
issue will simply evaporate in the meantime, and, for them, pas-
sage of time is necessary."
Beyond the buying of time, the life span of commissions is
important in relation to the policy context within which the com-
mission exists. This is well illustrated by the PLLRC. Two policy
matters dominated the PLLRC work and report. One was
whether the nation had reached the point where broad disposal
of federal lands no longer served a valid national purpose. The
other matter was the nature of the management system that
should govern the use of federal lands. This was the context
within which the Commission was established and within which
it saw its report. Yet, in the six years between passage of the law
creating the Commission and release of its report, there was a
major change in the policy context within which the PLLRC rec-
" Derthick, supra note 3, at 631.
" See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ommendations were to be debated. The implications of this
change were not fully recognized by the Commission, nor in all
likelihood could it have done much about it if they had been
recognized.
This change was dramatized by Earth Day and institution-
alized by the signing of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA), 2 both in early 1970. Obviously, the Commission
was not unaware of these occurences, and its report, released
some two months after Earth Day, has its share of references to
environmental quality and ecological imperatives. 3 But this was
not enough. The report, with its emphasis on resources manage-
ment and land use allocations, was met with opposition by an
environmentalist constituency that to a large extent did not even
exist in 1964.
Prefacing the first substantive chapter in the Commission's
report, a chapter on planning future land uses, is a picture of two
government land managers comparing a broad expanse of public
lands with a planning map spread out on the rocks in front of
them. Had the Commission fully understood the policy context
in which the report was being released, this picture might better
have been one of two officials with badges driving in a stake with
a sign that read, "Don't pollute! Violators will be prosecuted!"
The context for debating the report was one where regulation was
seen as a substitute for management, and the Commission had
opted for management. In the broad history of public land poli-
cies, six years is not long, but these particular six years appear
to have coincided with the threshold of major changes in the way
these policies were to be viewed.
D. A Commission's Impact
Perhaps it is idle to speculate on the impact the PLLRC
report may have had if the timing had been different, if the Com-
mission membership or staff had been different, if the Commis-
sion's process for making decisions had been different, or indeed
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
Caldwell, Policy, Planning, and Administration, in NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL OF
AMERICA, WHAT'S AHEAD FOR OUR PuBLIc LANDs 116-17 (H. Pyles ed. 1970). Caldwell, in
this review of the PLLRC report, notes that the report's acceptance of the need for includ-
ing environmental considerations in public land decisions would probably not have been
as strong if the report had been issued in 1968.
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if its recommendations had been different. What is clear, how-
ever, is that the Commission's report, instead of framing the de-
bate over public land policies since its release, has provided only
some of the necessary pieces of the framework.
The unique contribution of an advisory commission to prob-
lems of government policy and administration is its perspective.
In the case of the PLLRC, three aspects of its perspective were
derived from its temporary, detached, and joint legislative-
executive character.
First, the PLLRC was concerned with the whole range of
federal public lands. In the executive branch, responsibilities for
public lands are split among four major bureaus in two depart-
ments, as well as several other agencies with lesser responsibili-
ties. In the Congress, legislative responsibilities are split among
at least three committees in each house. An advisory commission
was uniquely able to bridge these divisions in considering a uni-
fied policy framework. That there is continuing resistance within
both the executive branch and the Congress to such a unified view
does not deny its soundness.
Second, the historical perspective of the PLLRC, as one of
four public land commissions in the past 100 years, was broader
than that characteristic of most internal or congressional policy
reviews. Long-range impacts of possible policy changes were de-
veloped in addition to the usual short-run considerations.
Third, the Commission was by its very form well placed to
consider and define the appropriate balance between legislative
and executive responsibilities, which was the goal established in
Congressman Aspinall's letter to President Kennedy and the
President's response some two years before passage of the Act
creating the PLLRC. That the Commission worked hard on this
issue, which permeated all of its discussions and decisions, and
yet failed in achieving this goal does not detract from the poten-
tial usefulness of a joint legislative-executive commission. Where
Congress and the President have equivalent interests in finding
a solution to a public policy problem, the joint commission is a
logical form; but where only one party sees the joint commission
as a means of finding a solution, the results are almost sure to be
limited.
Providing a different perspective than that provided by other
government institutions and supporting policy proposals from
650 DENVER LAW JOURNAL VOL. 54
this perspective with well-reasoned and well-documented argu-
ments is the chief role of advisory commissions. It is one in which
they do not always perform perfectly, but their record is much
better than is often claimed.
